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The Russian revolution of 1917 has justifiably commanded the attention of hundreds of 
scholars, political theorists, activists, novelists, and poets, a s  each generation struggles anew to 
comprehend its significance and deduce meaning from its kaleidoscopic images. Yet despite a truly 
prodigious number of books and articles, the essential task of understanding Russia' fluid social 
context in that pivotal year and analyzing its changing relation to unfolding politics remains 
largely to be done. This is so partly because analysts have lacked adequate data and 
methodologies, but also because of the difficulty in conceptualizing the problems involved in 
relating social forces to collective action, in connecting the social context or social matrix of the 
revolution to the ways in which power was exercised and ultimately distributed. However 
complex, these problems are arguably among the most important to our understanding of the 
entire revolutionary conjuncture. 
They are complex because the relationships themselves are multiple ones, and because the 
system of political and social ties as  they evolve in a time of revolution must ultimately be seen as  
a single whole, particularly if one is to ascribe meaning from their character to the very notion of 
"revolution." Conceptually these relationships must be seen as  "fundamental" structural or 
systemic connections between the nature of society and the character of the new order. They need 
to be distinguished from more "incidental" or contingent explanations of the ways in which popular 
activism affected the fates of parties and political groupings, a view of the "mob" or the 
"accident" of Kornilov's bringing Lenin to power. These fundamental or systemic aspects of 
revolutionary interaction deserve attention as  points of entry into an analysis of rural as well as  
urban Russia in 1917, although the present essay focuses on urban workers, and the form of 
popular activism to be explored is limited primarily to strikes -- only one aspect, albeit a central 
one, in the pattern of collective action as  a whole. 
By basic structural or systemic relationships I have in mind the correspondences between 
social values (broadly defined), political institutions, and social stability. Included among "social 
values" are such cultural attributes as  popular attitudes toward authority, gender relations, 
notions of law and the state, shared ideas about appropriate social hierarchies, and common 
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principles of justice or civil liberties, among others. Political institutions include not only prominent 
government or state agencies, but more important for our purposes, those lesser known bodies 
created especially to resolve conflicts. By "social stability," I refer to some point along the 
heuristic continuum between conditions of order and those of upheaval. While a form of social 
stability can obviously be achieved by repressive actions of governments alone, no effective 
instruments of repressive control existed in revolutionary Russia during the months from 
February to October, and social order was thus dependent on the ways in which the objectives of 
the new regime itself were compatible with broader social and culture patterns. Central here, 
consequently, were the ways in which Russia's various political institutions and structures were or 
were not able to mediate the range of conflicts and antagonisms that were reflected in strikes and 
other forms of collective action during 1917, and which occur to some degree in every society, 
whether or not it finds itself in a revolutionary situation. 
The conceptual framework I am trying to draw here is also related to the differential 
nature of power and authority. By "power" I have in mind both the "raw" ability of one set of 
actors to coerce others, and the much more complex coercion immanent in particular socio- 
economic systems and their attendant social relations. The first form was revealed quite clearly 
in the February revolution itself, whose historical importance at the time and afterwards had in 
no small measure to do with the ways in which it demonstrated the ability of mass collective 
action to overthrow an established regime. Petrograd workers and others also grasped an 
understanding of their power in this respect through action itself, undoubtedly carrying into 
subsequent months the belief that it could be exercised again. The second was apparent before 
February as well as  after in several ways, but especially during 1917 in the manner in which the 
structures of Russia's deteriorating economy increasingly coerced workers of all sorts (as well as 
other social groups) into various patterns of deprivation over which they had no control. "Power" 
in both of these senses, however, needs to be distinguished from "authority," whose essential 
attribute has to do with some legitimizing system of values. These constitute a superordinate (or 
"constitutional") restraint on behavior, and underly quite a different set of political relationships 
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than those reflected either by the "raw" power of striking Petrograders in February, or the 
coercive attributes of a system of industrial production or commodity distribution on the verge of 
collapse. 
As Leopold Haimson has argued, the importance of this before 1917 had to do with the 
ways in which authority and power both were related even to those social formations which, in his 
terms, were "out of joint" with ~oslovie and other categorical elements of old regime Russia. As 
the superordinate elements of tsarist authority were discarded, the principal political task of the 
new revolutionary order was to bring competing forms and uses of power in sufficient balance to 
allow stable socio-political relations and orderly change, and to do so a t  least in part, if elements of 
social and political democracy were to be preserved, through the creation of new superordinate (or 
"constitutional") restraints. This meant, in effect, pulling what I have labelled "fundamental" 
socio-political relationships back "into joint": assuring some degree of correlation, in other words, 
between systems of values, new political structures, and social order. At the same time, the 
application of "raw" power had to be contained by some generally accepted system of restraints. 
As this essay will try to suggest, the changing nature of strikes themselves affected these 
fundamental socio-political relationships in 1917, but to understand how, one must further 
recognize some of the conceptual problems involved in this form of labor activism, and suggest 
ways in which its own interior dimensions need to be analyzed. For if the revolutionary process 
itself is a large and complicated matter, so, too, are strikes, involving along with other forms of 
collective action complex aspects of objective behavior and circumstance a s  well a s  subjective 
experience. 2 
First among these latter dimensions is what Haimson has identified as  the "problem of . 
social identities": the ways in which an individual's sense of who he or she was in revolutionary 
Russia related to political outlooks and the nature of collective action in general. As Hairnson has 
argued, j&l social actors clearly brought multiple identities into the revolutionary period, and those 
most involved in the struggle for change in the years leading up to 1917 are identifiable not by 
any single characteristic of social position, but by combinations of indices related in each case to 
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the inability of extant institutions and socio-economic relations to accommodate their needs3 As 
we begin to analyze 1917, however, one central issue clearly has to do with the difficult question 
of social group or class coherence: the degree to which the patterns and pressures of a9g.regat.e 
identities may have come to dominate tendencies toward social differentiation. The revolutionary 
process as  a whole, in fact, may well be correlated in some important ways to the moments when 
aggregate identities like "worker" or "bourgeois," "gentry" or "peasant" began to overwhelm the 
more particularistic identities of trade or profession, geography, or traditional social status. In 
terms of Russian labor, the question of how or why these unifying identities may have come to 
dominate particularistic ones cannot be separated from the changing nature and form of labor 
activism, and especially strikes, from the actual experience of conflict. Thus the nature of the 
strike movement and of labor activism more generally must be analyzed in terms of the ways in 
which diverse groups of workers were (and were not) pulled together into a class conscious of its 
identity. In others words, it is essential to determine the extent to which collective action in 
revolutionary Russia was consciously class-based action. 
Second, one must also recognize the degree to which social interactions themselves lay a t  
the heart of these complex processes of class formation and political choices. Most immediate in 
the experience of workers were those interactions between labor and management that emerged in 
the course of specific conflicts, but we must also consider triangular patterns of interaction 
between workers, employers, and both official and unofficial agencies of the regime (including, in 
some instances, the soviets). This dimension of the problem is very much complicated by 
variations among localities and industries, but everywhere in 1917, a t  the center or on the 
periphery, it was the nature of these interactions themselves which gave many workers (and 
others) a sense of who they were, or a t  least of who they were a, with equally significant 
consequences. 
Finally, there are the closely related and extremely complex problems of "representation" 
and "perception": the ways in which various social groups and political formations presented 
themselves to others and were perceived by them, and the ways, further, in which activist 
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behavior actually signified values, consciousness, or other elements of sentiment and belief that 
may have underlay political inclinations. In 1917 the notion of "representation" has further 
meaning in the manner in which, on one hand, socio-economic and political structures themselves 
reflected values and commitments, and on the other, the ways in which collective action signified 
political mentalities and outlooks. 
However complex, the problems of representations and perception are central to our 
understanding of the revolutionary period both in the ways they affected expectations and 
judgments, and in the manner they contributed to the formation of both class and political 
consciousness. Appearances and perceptions associated with the formation of the first and second 
coalitions, for example, very much affected what activist workers thought strikes could achieve in 
May and June, whatever the underlying economic and political realities. Similarly, the ways in 
which forms and relations of production, commodity distribution or even representative politics 
were also perceived to involve basic conceptions of property, law, or even civil rights necessarily 
affected the ways in which workers and others began to think about the links between such 
elements and their own social interests. To get a t  these important matters, and to understand in 
particular their relation to labor activism and to evaluate the degree of complementarity in outlook 
between different social groups and political contenders, we must consequently explore what might 
be called the "language" of strikes, expressed in both formal and informal demands, and determine 
a s  well as  we can the ways in which it may have reflected underlying commitments. 
Obviously none of these matters can be fully explored in a single essay. Nor can the 
conceptual issues we raise be neatly systematized into a model of social revolution. But they do 
constitute building blocks toward some future model that might better account for the explosive 
power of labor activism in 1917 than explanations based primarily on ideology and politics and by 
examining strikes within this broader framework, we should be able to bring our understanding of 
labor activism as  a whole into sharper relief. .The questions we therefore ask are these: how are 
we to understand the nature of strikes in revolutionary Russia? How did the nature of strikes and 
other forms of labor activism relate to fundamental structural or systemic aspects of Russian 
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society and politics? And what, finally, can we suggest as  the possible links between the strike 
process itself and the relations of power and authority underlying the Bolsheviks' coming to 
power? 
Let us start by reviewing briefly the first phase of the revolutionary period, and by 
suggesting possible relationships between the nature of strikes and labor protests and the broader 
political milieu. As Diane Koenker and I have indicated elsewhere, strikes and other forms of labor 
protest declined sharply in frequency and scope in the immediate aftermath of the February 
upheaval, and only began to occur again with some regularity just before the formation of the first 
coalition in late ~ ~ r i l . ~  From May until the July days, somewhat more than 4 strikes a day 
began on the average throughout Russia, forming what might be called a spring "cluster" or strike 
"wave" that extended until just after the July days, when frequencies again fell significantly. The 
period between March 3 and July 6 can thus conveniently be considered as a whole for our 
purposes, even if variations also occurred within this period, and even though close analysis can 
discern changes beginning to occur in overall patterns during the last weeks before the collapse of 
the government on July 2. 
For most students of this period, politics has dominated the historical discourse. Relying 
heavily on perceptions of the time, the received wisdom emphasizes the relationship between the 
politically destabilizing nature of these strikes and the inability of the first two Provisional 
government cabinets to exercise a firm hand in the area of labor policy. The character of strikes is 
largely seen as  a consequence of the continued activism of politically conscious metallists, 
especially among the Vyborg workers in Petrograd who had played such a crucial part in the 
overthrow of the tsar. The weakness of the regime is attributed overwhelmingly to the problematic 
nature of dual power, both before and after the formation of the first coalition a t  the end of ~ ~ r i l . ~  
There are two difficulties with this perspective. One is related to the nature of strikes 
themselves, the other with the way in which "dual power" may or may not have reflected 
. 
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competitive notions about the role of authority in Russia's new political system. In contrast to 
analyses of more impulsive types of labor activism, such as attacks on foremen or the "carting 
out" of factory administrators, an extensive literature on strikes generally contradicts the view of 
those who see this form of activism as  reflecting similarly reactive or anarchic impulses, a blind 
and insatiable lashing out for revenge or selfish gains, a s  Russian strikes are often characterized. 
On the contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that strikes everywhere occur more often in times 
of economic prosperity than crisis (since workers understand the better opportunities for gain); and 
that few workers willingly risk their livelihood in conditions where strikes might shut plants 
permanently or where alternative employment is not readily available, as  clearly became the case 
in revolutionary Russia. There are obviously exceptional cases, but particularly in conditions of 
political democracy, strikes are most often a consequence of rational calculus, a weapon and 
strategy adopted by workers in the expectation that their efforts will be rewarded and they will 
end up better off. And in these circumstances, contrary to the arguments of most Soviet 
historians, strikes can serve the purposes of social order a s  well as  class conflict, relieving the 
conflictual pressures built into labor management relations. 6 
Seen in this way, strikes in 1917 bore a t  least the of becoming a constructive 
part of the new order in revolutionary Russia, provided their goals, nature, and scope did not 
fundamentally contradict the basic principles and values underlying Russia's new political 
institutions and the formation of the new regime. To what extent, we must therefore ask, 
there such a common set of values or principles among Soviet leaders, government figures, and 
other representatives of the new order? In the view of many, the very division of power between 
the government and the soviets precluded the emergence of anything of the sort, paving the way 
for ideologues like Lenin to capture popular imagination and support. The question is a difficult 
and important one, but its answer turns, we think, not so much on institutional forms as on 
perspectives of social order and concerns about mass power. 
As Leopold Haimson has argued, one of the most important aspects of "dual power" had 
to do with the ways in which it represented and articulated "a sense of the deep divisions that 
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separated the upper and lower strata of urban and rural Russia, and of the inevitability of their 
reflection in the institutional framework that would have to be pieced together to defend the 
country and the revolution."" As he further indicates, and as  Ziva Galili so admirably 
demonstrates in her book, this division of power initially evoked substantial support among broad 
strata of the population.8 I would argue this was largely so, however, not simply, and probably 
not primarily, because of representations of class or a realistic appreciation of social cleavages, 
whatever the rhetoric, but because of what the February revolution itself revealed about the 
power of mass action exercised without reference to constraining authority. Insofar a s  the 
institutional divisions reflected by the network of soviets was accepted by such groups as, say, the 
Petrograd Society of Factory and Mill Owners (not to mention the new ministers themselves), it 
was largely as a means of keeping mass power in check. 
Indeed, many Soviet Executive Committee members themselves saw one of their primary 
tasks to be the creation of socio-economic and political circumstances in which further upheavals of 
this sort would never again be needed. In creating factory-based arbitration boards (an important 
element of the March 10 agreement with the Petrograd Society of Factory and Mill Owners), and 
then in pressing workers to utilize these instruments as a means of resolving conflicts, the Soviet 
leadership's primary objective was not simply to advance workers' interests but also to 
reestablish conditions of social and political stability. The patterns of mutual restraint that 
Haimson suggests the sovietlregime partition temporarily induced in these groups' mutual 
relations was conditioned by a shared recognition of common tasks, especially the construction of a 
new order in which superordinate and legitimizing authority correlated to real power relationships. 
Thus "dual power" in important ways was a misnomer, since one overarching aim of a t  
least a large component of the Soviet leadership in domestic matters, if not the social interests it 
represented, was fundamentally that of the Provisional Government itself: to mitigate (or channel) 
social conflict in the interests of democratic political stabilization, and more importantly, to 
restrain its contours within mutually acceptable limits, based on common assumptions about civil 
rights, the legitimate use of power to advance particularistic interests, and the superordinate 
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qualitities of (constitutional) law, postol'ku poskol'ku notwithstanding. This perspective was 
challenged from the start  in Petrograd by a more radical vision of potential social transformation, 
but it lay a t  the core of moderate Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary thinking in the 
capital and was especially strong in Moscow and the provinces. The resulting congruence was one 
of perspective, not policy, and only partly derived from underlying values. But it allowed broad 
acceptance, a t  least initially, of institutions like factory committees as a means of organizing 
workers; it facilitated efforts to improve wages and conditions generally in the workplace; and 
most important for our purposes, it necessarily legitimized strikes. 
Here most important was the tension between these organized forms of protest and the far 
more impulsive types of action like samosud\., attacks on foremen, or the wheelbarrowing of 
factory administrators. As Koenker and I have detailed elsewhere, the latter obviously continued 
to some degree, and were clearly inimical to social order.' But insofar a s  they were also highly 
particularized, occurring for various reasons with little if any forethought or organization, they 
reflected a t  worst a generalized disrespect for legal procedures or the efforts of the new regime to 
build a basis for power in constitutional authority, rather than a coherent rejection of the existing 
socio-political order itself. They were also in themselves a poor means now of effective worker 
mobilization, since they provided no ready way of articulating grievances or allowing their 
mediation. And most important, a s  the reports of the Factory Inspectorate itself indicate, they 
were also becoming increasingly less frequent in the spring, as  "conscious workers," in the 
Inspectorate's own words, "succeeded in a number of instances k l o m  r d  in instituting a 
degreee of order and discipline among the workf~rce." '~ 
Strikes on the other hand represented important opportunities for comparatively orderly 
mobilization, and were both a traditional and critical testing ground of essential interests once 
mediation efforts failed. Like other forms of protest, strikes invariably represented a contest of 
relative power, and in this sense were always political. But the contest itself required 
accommodation as  well as  concession, a mutual respect for outcomes and a willingness a t  the end 
to move forward, however great the accompanying tensions. Strikes were thus an essential means 
I 
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of readjusting social and political relations within an industrial branch or enterprise without 
necessarily undermining the stability of the socio-political order as  a whole; in contrast, attacks on 
foremen or other forms of assault in the workplace could only bring chaos or repression. 
Ziva Galili has documented the particular concerns of Menshevik praktiki in this regard, 
and has shown brilliantly the fundamental tension underlying the Petrograd Soviet's early efforts 
to keep attacks on foremen and similar acts in check while gains were negotiated with employers 
and the regime. - The Soviet leadership also felt it was urgent to bring organization and 
"responsible" leadership to the shop floor. l2 Such views were strongly held in the Provisional 
Government a s  well, particularly by the officials most closely responsible for labor, N. V. 
Nekrasov, the new minister of transport (a left Kadet), and A. I. Konovalov, the Moscow textile 
magnate who became minister of trade and industry. (The latter carried responsibility for labor 
affairs until an independent labor ministry was created in May.) Each man had strongly 
supported worker participation in the War Industry Committees before February and each now 
accepted the idea, as  Nekrasov put it, that the revolution "dictated a basic transformation of all 
institutions," requiring popular participation a t  all levels. l3 While activism in the workplace had 
to be organized and controlled by the soviets. and their agents, it was clearly the state's role to 
foster and regulate institutions for mediating social conflict, and to institutionalize traditional 
forms of protest common to "bourgeois democracies." For men like Nekrasov and Konovalov, this 
meant among other things finally recognizing strikes as  legitimate, logical, and even a necessary 
part of the democratic process as a whole, however undesirable they might be from the standpoint 
of maintaining production. 
In other words, while the institutions of "dual power" clearly represented the realities of 
social cleavage in revolutionary Russia, what was implicitly affirmed from above in early March 
on W sides of the dual-power divide was a new set of common values. At its core was not simply 
a formal commitment to legality and civil rights, but an implicit sense of social ethics and even 
social justice. Management-labor interests would be legally contested. Commitments made would 
be respected. Deep social inequities would be mitigated. Appropriate and legal protest activity 
t- 
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would become part and parcel of a functioning democratic system. Civil order would bring social 
betterment. 
If we look a t  the most obvious manifestations of labor protest in the spring of 1917 it is 
easy to understand the perceptions of corltemporary observers and historians alike. Leaving aside 
the continuing (if diminishing) acts of violence on the shop floor, the massive demonstrations 
provoked by Miliukov's note on Russia's war aims, the June protests against the offensive, or the 
often unruly political meetings that accompanied the first city duma election campaigns, there was 
much about strikes themselves that made them appear to be little more than a continuation of the 
February protests, especially in Moscow and Petrograd. For the period March 3 through July 6 
some 5 11 strikes took place throughout Russia as  a whole for which we have a reasonable amount 
of information. These involved a t  a minimum some 619,000 strikers, and frequently included more 
than one enterprise. Some 75 percent of all strikes took place in industrial enterprises, 18.8 
percent in service establishments (restaurants, laundries, etc.), and only 6.2 percent on railroad or 
steamship lines, other transportation companies, or among other employment groups (including 
those that the sources do not specify clearly). l4 
It is hardly difficult to find out who these strikers were. As Table 1 indicates, the most 
strike-prone industrial group by far between March and early July remained the metal workers, 
the "vanguard," a s  Leopold Haimson has shown, of the pre-revolutionary strike movement as 
well.15 The strike propensity of metalists, a weighted ratio indicating the relative proportion of 
strikers to the work force by industrial branch, was more than three times that of the leather 
workers, the next most active group, and almost eight times that of textile workers (Table 1, 
column 3). In absolute terms, the metalists predominance seems even stronger. Metalists alone 
accounted for more than 56 percent of all industrial strikers even before the July days. With this 
massive strike included in the calculations, the metalists share of the industrial strike force 
I 
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increases to approximately 80 percent, an extraordinary figure (Table 1, column 1). It  also 
constitutes some 65 percent of strikers in all enterprises, industrial and non-industrial combined. 
We also know from other calculations that these strikers remained concentrated in 
Petrograd and Moscow, just a s  they were earlier, and that the metalists' tendency to strike here 
was shared by other strikers. Strike "i*tensitiesW for these two cities, the percentage of the total 
work force on strike, were 81.9 and 49.3 respectively between March 3 and July 6 (Table 2). In 
none of the other regions of the country did the level of strikers exceed 13 percent of the respective 
labor forces . '~inal l~,  as Table 3 indicates, the metalists alone were practically the only group to 
continue using strikes for overt political goals, a s  they did during the July days. The only otfier 
group involved significantly in political strikes were the textile workers, and most of their strikes 
occurred in early March, as  the revolution spread into Vladimir and Kostroma provinces. 
Thus the pervasive role of metalists in spring strikes appears confirmed, and so indeed it 
must have seemed to industrialists, manufacturers, and the verkhi in general from the sheer 
numbers of strikers from this branch in Petrograd and Moscow. In fact, if we look closely a t  the 
number of strikes in this period as  opposed to strikers, the metalists' dominance is less pronounced 
(Table 4). I t  was also also concentrated in Moscow rather than Petrograd (Table 2). Service sector 
workers, on the other hand, were quite active in the capital, even though most of their strikes 
were quite small.16 Nevertheless, the dominant perceptions of Russia's revolutionary leadership 
on sides of the dual power divide were logically ones which identified strikes overwhelmingly 
with the activities of metalists alone. 
The implications of this were hardly unimportant to unfolding politics. The strong ties 
historically between metalists and the Bolsheviks were well known. Lenin's return to Petrograd in 
early April had been greeted with enormous enthusiasm, particularly by workers from the Vyborg 
district, a metalists' stronghold. Workers from Vyborg had participated overwhelmingly in the 
February strikes that toppled the old regime, and for years had dominated labor activism in the 
capital. I t  was here that the party centered its activities not only for Petrograd, but also to a large 
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extent for the country the party as a whole. Thus the very process of striking was widely 
construed as an extension of the use of "raw" power reflected during February and before. 
To what extent, however, was this sense of strikes and strikers an  accurate reflection of 
workers' goals and mentalities? And does the numerical dominance of metalists mean that the 
metalworking "vanguard" stood apart from fellow workers in this period, either in terms of 
political consciousness or class allegiance, and that one's identity as a carpenter or printer 
continued to remain in this period a stronger element of consciousness than more aggregate class 
identities like "worker" itself? If this were the case, one might imagine with General Kornilov and 
others that political stability could be strengthened in urban Russia if metal plants were simply 
seized by the state, assuming it had the means to do this, and metalists themselves forcefully 
repressed. 
To answer this difficult question we need to differentiate carefully between different 
sectors of production, and examine as closely as we can what strikers in each sector wanted. This 
in itself presents complex analytical problems. For all of the strikes throughout Russia in 1917 for 
which we have a reasonable amount of information, we have recorded more than 250 different 
strike demands. l7 In the aggregate, workers demanded higher wages, better personal treatment, 
and improved working conditions. In the particular, they demanded heated shops, boiling water for 
tea, vacation pay, different types of accident insurance, playgrounds for their children, the right to 
sit down in certain places during slack time, and more leisure, as well as  the removal of 
specifically named foremen or administrators. In their very richness and variety it can be said 
that such demands reflected an authentic voice of proletarian discontent in 1917 and a common 
language of protest. To evaluate them, however, and particularly to examine changes over time, it 
is necessary to group them into more manageable and familiar categories, namely wages, factory 
conditions (including hours), workers' dignity, and work rule (including factory control). l8 
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The problem is that such aggregations can represent both more and less than they appear. 
Strikes over wages may disguise other pressing demands which for reasons relating to strategy or 
tactics are not presented to employers; carefully enumerated demands for formal address by 
supervisors, for an end to the demeaning custom of tipping, or for some form of free time or 
vacation, surely describe real expectations more fully than the phrase "workers' struck over 
dignity issues." The language of protest, in other words -- the workers' stated demands and the 
ways in which they were represented to management -- may well include a multiplicity of 
additional meanings. The extent to which this is so can only be deduced from a careful analysis of 
content, and although this task is a difficult one when dealing with masses of historical data, it is 
crucial if we are to understand strikes in terms of the ways in which they both influenced and 
reflected social and political relations. 
In our work on strikes Koenker and I have consequently formulated an additional, parallel 
aggregation of workers7 demands, based partly on specific contexts, partly on what we know about 
what certain kinds of demands actually implied in revolutionary Russia. On this 'basis, each of the 
more than 250 specific demands in our data set has been regrouped into several additional 
categories, where appropriate, including one which identifies strikes challenging established 
managerial rights (like the power to set wage rates or to hire and fire workers) and another which 
shows that conflict was related to prior negotiations and agreement that management failed to 
honor. Each of these parallel aggregations allows us greater access to possible differences between 
what workers actually represented a s  their goals, and what they may also have actually been 
struggling for; and each may allow us to understand better as  well the nature of management 
labor interactions and the strength of worker identities. 
What do these various calculations suggest about what striking workers actually wanted in 
the spring of 1917? If we look first at overt or manifest demands, it seems quite clear that strikes 
generally reflected "traditional" and minimally confrontational labor aspirations during these 
weeks, despite the dominant role in aggregate terms played by Petrograd and Moscow metalists. 
The overwhelming number of strikes in the first half of 1917 concerned issues which were 
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manifestly "economic": wages, factory conditions, hours, leave time -- the familiar goals of strikes 
in other times and places. 71 percent of the strikes up to July 6 (involving a t  a minimum more 
than 300,000 strikers) dealt directly with wage rates, piece work schedules, bonuses, and such 
wage related issues as  pay for lost work time; some 28.6 percent (118,000 plus strikers) 
concerned hours, vacations, tools, safety matters, child labor or other questions relating to 
workplace conditions. Of the remainder, a little more than 16 percent dealt with issues relating to 
workplace control, and 7.4 percent with questions concerning factory relations, tips for restaurant 
workers, or other matters associated with workers' dignity. (See Table 5.) 
Strikes over wages increased in number especially as  prices began to rise in May and 
J u n e g  Less frequently, but with extremely positive results, strikers also demanded respect, 
particularly those workers in the service sector like restaurant and hotel employees. Traditionally, 
supervisors had used the familar a, equating workers with serfs, children, and other social 
inferiors. Now workers expected to be addressed with the formal yy, and were willing to strike to 
assure the end of this and other forms of verbal abuse. The same holds true even for demands 
over issues directly related to workers' "control," a term which in the early period of the 
revolution had far more to do with increasing the rights and prerogatives of factory committees 
and trade unions than it did with running an enterprise.20 By late spring, wo rkers had begun to 
assert their right to intervene in hiring and firing, a direct challenge to management rights, but in 
relatively few numbers. For the period between March and July, we find only 25 "control" strikes 
which included this demand, 23 of which involved a little less than 47,000 strikers, according to 
our estimates. Sixteen were in industrial enterprises, seven in the service sector. "Control" issues 
instead during these weeks, a t  least insofar as they were represented in formal demands, had far 
more to do with seeking representation in the industrial relations system rather than seeking to 
dominate the enterprise. 
This is not to suggest, we repeat, that conflict over all these issues was not a struggle for 
power within the workplace. But assuming the language of protest reflected in this range of overt 
demands accurately represented worker mentalities between March and July, it would still seem 
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that the strike movement in this period was not fundamentally incompatible with the shared goals 
of the Soviet and Provisional government. In their manifest content, demands over wages, 
conditions, dignity and even control issues were almost entirely focused on achieving goals directly 
related to the workplace, corresponding in form to those sought by workers in more developed 
"bourgeois" democracies. The political contest reflected in strikes thus had little to do with with 
the "raw" or "impulsive" power associated with attacks on managerial personnel, but with the 
distribution or balance of rewards and prerogatives within the established socio-economic system. 
The authority of the new regime in this respect was neither threatened nor directly challenged. 
This view is confirmed when we submit all of our strike data for the period between March 
3 and July 6 to multiple regression analysis, a measure of the dominant forces underlying 
strikes2' Here we find that the highest strike intensities occurred in areas with the highest 
nominal wages and also a decline in real wages (a characteristic, of course, of Petrograd itself and 
to a lesser extent of Moscow). These wage effects appear to dominate all other factors, so much 
so that once they are controlled for, factory size and even the element of urban concentration do 
not affect strike intensity levels. Past strike experience, however, measured by participation in the 
strike movement from 1913 to 1916, also turns out to be signficantly correlated with strike 
intensities in this period. We can thus say with a high degree of certainty that the most strike- 
prone areas of Russia before July 7 were those that had struck most before the February 
revolution, had high wages, and a falling real wage. Thus "ordinary" rather than radical impulses 
seem to have largely underlay even the strike prone metalists, whose attributes of course included 
experience in labor activism and who were suffering in 1917 a strong relative degree of economic 
deprivation. 
This is not, however, the whole story. When we utilize our second system of aggregating 
workers demands, and analyze spring and early summer strikes in terms of this underlying, 
"implicit," language of protest, we find rather different patterns. Whereas only some 16.6 percent 
of all strikes manifestly demanded some degree of workers' control (Table 5, column 2), some 39.3 
percent indirectly challenged traditional management rights. These strikes tended to be small- 
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scale, and may have included only about 24 percent of all strikers in this period, but they still 
suggest a sizeable undercurrent of protest over issues of authority in these early months, much 
larger than is evident using conventional analysis of strike causes. Equally interesting, as we 
learn from additional calculations, is the fact that both implicit and explicit challenges to employer 
rights seemed to have involved predominantly skilled workers in the first half of the year, a t  least 
in industrial strikes, although variations among industries were substantial, as  Table 6 further 
indicates.22 In the wood, paper manufacturing, and printing industries, the percentage of strikers 
challenging the factory order was significantly higher than elsewhere. By contrast, metal workers 
ranked low (7.5 percent). In fact, in non-political strikes, metalists pressed almost exclusively for 
economic improvements, rather than a greater share of managerial power. Almost all metalists 
striking in non-political strikes demanded better wages. As far a s  can be detemined, less than 1 
percent made explicit demands about workers' control, easily the lowest share of any group of 
industrial workers. 
What we have, then, is a most interesting if rather complicated picture: on one hand, the 
inclination to use strikes a s  overt political weapons concentrated almost exclusively among 
metalists in the late spring, and erupting in force in early July; on the other, an extensive use of 
"economic" or "non-political" strikes by other industrial sectors throughout the period to press the 
frontiers of factory control and contest traditional managerial prerogatives. In fact, the 
significance of this latter type of demand in the spring in terms of an aggregate class 
consciousness lies precisely in the identity of the groups which pressed them most intensely. They 
were the skilled "vanguard" workers in the metal industry, but workers in small industries 
and factories, and in retail stores and service establishments, whom the tsarist legal system had 
placed at the greatest disadvantage vis a vis their employers. As Table 6 indicates, 85 percent of 
striking service sector employees made demands which implicitly challenged managerial authority; 
among retail workers, nine out of every ten strikers pressed such claims. In other words, these 
were groups of workers who had not had political influence before February, whose strikes were 
the most easily repressed, whose personal relationship to their employers the most closely 
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monitored. Thus while dominant picture in these weeks still suggests what might be called an 
"ordinary" paradigm of strike activism, one conforming in broad contours to "bourgeois 
democracies" in general and not fundamentally a t  odds with the mutual aspirations of soviet 
figures, employer associations, and the regime, a strong undercurrent of opposition to "bourgeois" 
values clearly existed, a t  least insofar as  these values were reflected in the traditional 
prerogatives of management. 
To a large extent, we can therefore say with some confidence that the freedom to strike in 
1917 finally provided Russian workers with a way to negotiate forcefully but "legitimately" for an 
end to low wages, long hours, poorly lighted and unventilated work spaces, hazardous machinery, 
and such concerns as the use of child labor -- all notorious problems before the revolution, even 
relative to Western Europe and the United States -- and that they took great advantage of the 
opportunity. The dominant perceptions of the verkhi in this first period of the revolution were 
consequently ones which miscontrued the degree to which the overwhelming number of strikes 
themselves, in metals as  well as  in all other branches 'were not fundamentally incompatible with 
the shared goals of moderate soviet and government officials alike or necessarily undermining to 
the authority of the new order. At the same time, however, while strikes were used overtly as 
political weapons only on rare occasions, and a t  least until July 2, only by a relatively small 
number of workers in metals and textiles, workers in other branches were also clearly using 
strikes to press against the frontiers of managerial control and fundamentally change the balance 
of power in the workplace. Although the very dominance of metalists made it difficult to perceive, 
the cohering elements of a politically radical class consciousness among workers were thus 
emerging themselves in the course of "routine" management-labor interactions before July, even 
as strikes everywhere brought workers substantial economic gains. 
Still, strike activism before July, although of large proportions, was not necessarily 
threatening to Russia's revolutionary order, despite ominous undercurrents. Acts of violence in 
conjunction with strikes continued, but infrequently, relative to the number of strikes 
t h e m ~ e l v e s . ~ ~  Moderate Soviet leaders and especially their representatives in the first coalition 
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continued to stress the importance of organization and restraint, of keeping impulsive behavior in 
check in favor of cooperation or legitimate struggle, values shared with the verkhi as a whole. 
Workers struggled with the competitive identities of "nation" and "class," but as  long as they 
believed their welfare was being served it was possible their activism could take place within the 
system both Soviet and government leaders were trying to create. 
Early July proved a turning point in the development of labor activism in 1917, but not 
only in terms of the way the July Days gave voice to radical sentiments. Calm returned rather 
quickly to Petrograd streets and factories. after the Bolshevik supported uprising. Lenin, Trotsky, 
and other Bolshevik leaders went into hiding or were arrested. While soviet and government 
figures wrestled with the implications of the massive protests and struggled after the Kadet 
resignations to form a new cabinet, workers everywhere temporarily laid the strike weapon aside. 
Between the end of the July days and the beginning of August, strikes averaged only a little more 
than 2 per day; strikers, fewer than 500 per day for the 70 percent whose size we can reasonably 
estimate, the lowest of the entire revolutionary period. Strike activity resumed during August, but 
again subsided a t  the end of the summer and during the early September harvest period, perhaps 
surprisingly considering the tensions surrounding the Kornilov affair. 
In mid-September, however, a new period of intense strike activity began, lasting until the 
Bolsheviks came to power. New strikes broke out at an  average of 4.8 per day between September 
16 and October 25, involving by our minimum estimates more than 1,200,000 workers (which are 
here based on only 68 percent of the strikes in our file for these weeks); 200,000 to 300,000 
additional workers remained off the job in strikes begun during August and earlier. From an 
average size of 236 strikers per strike in April and 480 in May, strikes rose to an  average of 
almost 6400 in these weeks. The daily number of workers on strike now averaged more than 
30,000, far and away the highest level of the entire revolutionary period, and an extraordinary 
figure under any circumstances. 24 
. 
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The magnitude of the fall strike wave in revolutionary Russia is impressive for several 
reasons, not least of which the fact that it occurred a t  a time of sharply deteriorating economic 
conditions, often not conducive to Between February and July, a t  least 550 enterprises 
with upwards of 100,000 workers may have closed their doors. The greatest number of affected 
workers were in the textile industry, particularly cotton; the largest number of enterprises was in 
the food processing sector; and the highest number of enterprises per worker was in the production 
of wood and wood products.26 Each of these branches had been facing substantial production 
problems since before the February revolution, but difficulties intensified in 1917, and spread as  
well to industries which previously had been fairly secure. More than 90 metal processing plants 
closed their doors a t  least temporarily in the June-August period, for example, largely due to a 
lack of fuel and raw materials (the result, in many minds, of inadequate state controls), but also 
because employers locked out potential strikers. Initially, these were almost entirely smaller 
plants and shops, located for the most part outside of Petrograd and Moscow. By the end of the 
summer, however, production even in favored defense plants had fallen dramatically, in some 
cases to as little as 60 percent of February levels. In the highly favored chemicals industry, the 
. . .  decline was almost 40 percent compared to 1 9 1 6 . ~ ~  According to the journal 
more than 500,000 workers in European Russia were unemployed on the eve of the October 
revolution. 28 
Under most circumstances, this "army of the unemployed" might have acted as a powerful 
brake on strike activity, particularly given inadequate unemployment relief. Employers had no 
hesitation in 1917 to employ scabs in place of strikers, and did so with a flourish in a number of 
highly publicized strikes, like that of the Petrograd laundry workers in ~ a ~ . ~ ~  Strikes meant 
risking wages, and trade unions even in the well-organized metals industry had few resources 
available to support their members.30 In many instances, they also played into the hands of 
employers eager for an excuse to shut down but reluctant to violate injunctions by government, 
soviet, and even employer association leaders against doing do. What began as strikes readily 
turned into lockouts in places where supplies were short, capital scarce, and owners alert to the 
. 
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changing climate of political opinion.31 Why, then, did workers strike in the fall? And what were 
they striking for? 
I t  should hardly surprise us that the primary manifest demand of striking workers 
continued to be for higher wages, a s  in the spring. "Control" issues had by now been largely 
settled by the legalization of institutions like factory committees, and as  we know, such groups 
were now functioning in most industrial plants. The question of factory hours had also been 
temporarily resolved by a series of settlements earlier on, in many instances recognizing an eight 
hour day, a t  least in principle. In aggregate terms, measured particularly by the total number of 
strikers, the question of wages seems to have remained the primary impetus pressing workers 
into the streets, and so it appeared to industrialists, soviet leaders, and members of the 
government alike who increasingly regarded this form of protest a s  irrational and anarchistic 
given the difficulties of maintaining industrial production and any semblance of economic stability. 
When we subject our data from July to October to multiple regression analysis, however, 
we find a very strong suggestion that these perceptions were wrong. None of the earlier 
correlations between wage levels and strike activity that characterized the strike process in the 
spring hold for the fall. Nor can the composition of the post-July strike force be explained by any 
of the conventional factors usually associated with this form of protest: not by wages, past strike 
experience, urban concentration, skill level, or factory size. 
How can we understand the "failure" of these regressions? One explanation has to do with 
a change in the rates of strikers across regions, from areas of higher to lower wage rates (Table 
2). In the period before July 7, the two cities of Petrograd and Moscow stood far above the other 
regions in the activism of their workers. In none of the other regions did the level of strikers 
exceed 13 percent of the respective labor forces. In the second half of the year, however, when 
the strike movement incorporated over 1.5 million workers across the country, Petrograd's 
activism is remarkably low in relative terms. Now workers of the Urals struck a t  a rate equal to 
two-and-a-half times the size of their industrial labor force; Moscow put more workers in the 
streets than were employed in industry; and one-third or more of the workers almost everywhere 
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went on strike. Yet only 13 percent of Petrograd's workers joined them. In every region except 
Petrograd and Odessa, in fact, the rate of strike participation more than doubled between the two 
periods, and in most regions was much higher. 
A second, more interesting explanation also begins to emerge when we look more closely a t  
the correlations between strikes and challenges to traditional managerial rights and power, both 
explicitly and implicitly. Now we find that in contrast to the spring, strikers overwhelmingly 
pressed the established boundaries of managerial prerogative even in strikes over wages and wage 
related issues. Whereas approximately 24 percent of all strikers between March 3 and July 6 used 
strikes to challenge managerial authority and secure a significant redistribution of power in the 
workplace (Table 5, column 4) more than 84 percent did so in the period between July 7 and 
October 25, as  far as we can estimate from the available data (Table 7, column 4). In absolute 
terms, the increase in ratios was even more remarkable, a consequence of the dramatic change in 
the number of strikers: more than ten times as  many strikers demanded rights and powers that 
had traditionally belonged in management in the fall as  in the spring! (Tables 5 and 7, column 
3 . 1 ~ ~  The manifest demand for wages, in other words, was a way of expressing in "legitimate" 
terms what striking workers really wanted, which was far greater control over the processes of 
production themselves. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the "failure" of our regressions seems to reflect 
dramatic changes in the propensity of different groups of workers to strike before and after July, 
as  Table 1 indicates. The strike propensity of leather workers increased more than five fold, from 
.88 to 5.38; that of textile workers from .38 to 1.44; wood workers from .33 to 1.35; and that of 
chemical workers from .09 to .60 (Table 1, column 3). Among the two most strike-prone groups 
now were oil workers and miners, who had not been involved in any meaningful strike activity in 
the spring, but which in the fall had strike intensity and propensity levels second only to the 
leather worker^.^^ Strikers in every industrial branch save one, in fact, were more prone to strike 
after the July Days than before, and in significantly higher numbers. The sole exception was 
metals, the "vanguard" element in the spring. For these leading activists, the share of the 
, 
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industrial strike force dropped from almost 80 percent to a little more than 16 percent (Table 1, 
column 1). 
Strikes in the fall thus reflected a shift from those who were previously most active to 
those who were less so; from relatively well paid, and skilled groups to those less well paid and 
less skilled; and from those generally regarded as "politically conscious" to those whose political 
outlooks were less well formed or discrete. And it was these latter workers, now, who were using 
strikes, the legitimate weapons of protest, to challenge directly what had earlier been assumed to 
be the basic prerogatives of management, even if their manifest objectives were still, legitimately, 
for higher wages. 
Why did these shifts occur? In what ways were they related to the fundamental or 
systemic aspects of society and politics in revolutionary Russia that we referred to a t  the start? 
And what do they suggest to us about the changing nature of social identities in 1917 and 
especially the development of something we can properly call class consciousness? In important 
and familiar ways, of course, each of these questions can be partly addressed in terms of forces 
exogenous to the workplace: growing dissatisfaction with the war; increasing activism in the 
. 
countryside; the Kornilov mutiny; the obvious uncertainties of moderate socialists and liberals both 
a s  to the appropriate form of coalition government and even the timing of Constituent Assembly 
elections. Yet the processes of politicization and working class formation largely stem as  well, in 
any circumstances, from workers' day to day experiences, their immediate and most apparent 
realities, since what occurs in the workplace necessarily conditions and structures broader 
perceptions. Thus workplace interactions are as  important a part of these processes as  the 
familiar and dramatic elements of high politics, and arguably moreso. 
In these terms, what was most important about the July Days is the extent to which what 
remained of conciliatory attitudes on the part of employers seemed everywhere to disappear, on 
the periphery a s  well as  in Moscow and Petrograd. Contract negotiations were interrupted or 
I 
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broken off between employers and metalists and leather workers in Petrograd and Moscow, oil 
workers in Baku, among the textilists in Vladimir and Kostroma, and between management and 
labor negotiators in other industries and places. Owners of restaurants and taverns reneged in 
Petrograd on concessions they had offered earlier. Leather manufacturers in Moscow rejected a 
settlement proposed by the government after three weeks of talks even though workers had 
already returned to their benches and expected to resume work. Railroad workers waited with 
increasing frustration for long promised bonuses and higher wage rates. 3 4 
At the same time, employers clearly became much less willing to give in to strikers 
demands. Although our data on the success rates for strikes are not comprehensive enough for us 
to be confident in exact statistics, the number of wage strikes lost after July may have been three 
times that of the spring, and in strikes concerned primarily with working conditions or workers' 
control, as  much as  ten to twenty percent greater. Even more telling in terms of management- 
labor relations was a dramatic reversal in strikes over issues of dignity, whose success rate may 
have fallen by as  much as  fifty percent. Whiie one might expect strikes over wages, conditions, 
and workers' control to be more difficult for workers to win in Russia's deteriorating economic 
circumstances and when notions of workers' rights were rapidly expanding, dignity strikes were 
essentially over cost-free issues, matters where one might expect to see improvements regardless 
of broadei political or economic conditions. 
Workers in many places were clearly frustrated by these hardening attitudes and sought 
ways to change them; activism and consciousness were integrally related. New strikes began to 
occur with some frequency expressly because employers failed to honor previous commitments or 
agreements, some formal and supposed to be legally binding, some only implied. Whereas strikes 
of this sort involved less than 21,000 workers in the spring by our estimates, we know that a 
minimum of 370,000 industrial workers struck for these reasons in the fall, and the actual 
number was probably much higher. Our own figures expand to more than 1 million if we include 
the approximately 700,000 railroaders who participated in a general strike in late September 
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because the wage increases promised by the much-heralded "Plekhanov Commission" were now 
considered fiscally irresponsible by the coalition regime. 
Appeals for state intervention also increased. Here, too, our data are not comprehensive, 
and we are certain only of broad trends. Nevertheless, almost three times as  many strikes may 
have involved active government intervention in the fall, compared to the spring; and strikes 
negotiated a s  a direct result of pressure from local or regional soviets may have increased by a 
third, and possibly more. At a time of diminishing rewards and increasing worker frustration over 
the effectiveness of legitimate forms of protest, in other words, both the state and the soviet 
structure both emerged as  an increasing important player in labor-management relations. 
Let us illustrate these trends with just one example, the experience of Baku oil workers. 
To many workers in this center of the Russian petroleum industry, the February revolution meant 
the long awaited opportunity to restore the industry-wide contract that workers had briefly 
enjoyed in 1904. The early accord had been a major victory for labor organizers, and brought 
equal treatment for a brief period to the various nationalities who worked the wells and refineries. 
Early in the spring, negotiations began with the oil "barons" from Nobel, Caspian Oil, "Neft," and 
other firms. Workers and their representatives hoped a new contract would prevent the companies 
in particular from keeping wages low through the discriminatory employment particularly of 
uneducated Azerbaidjani and Turkic workers. Despite expectations of an early and amicable 
settlement on the workers' part, negotiations broke off a t  the very end of June when the 
industrialists' association suddenly took a harder line. The draft contract negotiated by their own 
industry representatives was rejected, and by mid-July, the very notion of a contract itself was 
being challenged by a number of individual owners, despite the commitments of the industrialists' 
group. Not surprisingly, preparations began for a strike.35 
Because of its crucial importance to the national economy, the government itself soon 
became involved through minister of labor Skobelev. In late July, Skobelev travelled to Baku to 
participate directly in new talks, laying the government's prestige on the line. He announced that 
he expected "both sides to make concessions," but in fact, had difficulty moving the talks 
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forward.36 Among other things, the industrialists now insisted that any wage increase be tied to 
an increase in the price of oil. This brought strenuous opposition from the Baku soviet, the 
workers' delegates a t  the talks, and the government itself. Seeking some indication that a strike 
could be avoided, Skobelev proposed that a two week "advance" be paid on August 25 a t  the 
higher levels proposed in the draft contract, to be charged against the contract itself once it was 
signed. When he and the government a s  a whole insisted on maintaining current oil prices, the 
industrialists refused to budge. Efforts a t  conciliation collapsed, and after a month's additional 
preparation, more than 55,000 workers left their jobs.37 
The oil workers could not help but experience this prolonged and unsuccessful process of 
negotiation with feelings of frustration and even contempt. There was ample evidence of real need, 
and the draft settlement of mid-June seemed to satisfy all parties. In the face of the industrialists' 
resistance, moreover, both soviet leaders like Skobelev and the government itself appeared 
powerless; and the industrialists' new hostility to the very idea of a collective contract challenged 
f 
any thought that the regime could right what was deeply felt to be an historical injustice. I t  is 
impossible, in fact, to read reports of workers' meetings during September without appreciating- 
the degree to which the strike itself now assumed a broader political and social meaning. As with 
the 700,000 railroaders who also struck in late September, the Baku oil workers won their 
struggle when the regime itself caved in on the matter of pricing. 
In the process, however, the strike itself, even if over wages, had transcended its 
essentially economic content, and become an issue of class struggle and state power. Here and 
elsewhere, the very nature of strike related interactions cultivated broad class identities and a 
generalized class consciousness, as  one's position in the system of production took on great 
importance in terms of immediate well-being. If the new regime's struggle to have "nation" 
supercede class as  a source of identity was difficult enough from the start  in revolutionary Russia, 
the changing nature of strikes now made it virtually impossible. And insofar as the Baku workers' 
experience was broadly shared by workers in other branches, both in and outside of industry, the 
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pressures toward broad class identities and conciousness readily overcame the particularistic 
attachments of enterprise, profession, geography, and as  the Baku case suggests, ethnicity. 
At the same time, moreover, Baku workers and others could not help but become 
increasingly conscious of the degree to which what was now commonly termed the "bourgeois 
capitalist system" held real power over their lives and livelihoods. And insofar a s  the values of 
moderate soviet figures like Skobelev, the powers of the state itself, and the interests of the 
industrialists all appeared to coincide, any appeal to law and legality as  superordinate restraints 
on behavior were understandably compromised. In the perceptions of increasing numbers of 
workers, it was the "bourgeoisie" that refused to play by the rules of its own game. 
None of this is to suggest that there were not understandable reasons in many cases for 
the hardening of owners' views, or that employers alone were responsible for the increasing 
inability of workers to achieve their goals. Nor was the obvious politicization of the Baku strike 
solely the consequence of employer-worker interactions. The well-known flashpoints of 
revolutionary politics -- the Moscow State Conference, the Kornilov mutiny, Bolshevik electoral 
victories in urban soviets and municipal dumas -- all infused industrial relations with the urgency 
of the political moment. But the oil workers' experience indicates rather clearly that by the fall, 
triangular interactions of this sort -- between workers, employers, and the state -- were of 
increasing importance in shaping workers' perceptions and identities; and in the process, those 
who continued to defend the shared principles and values on which soviet and government 
authority had initially been based found their arguments increasingly challenged by practical 
experience. It  was not so much that Russia's workers had a different conception of law or justice 
than their trade union or soviet leaders (although some clearly did). Rather, the experience and 
outcome of activism itself pushed workers away from the moderates who had insisted that strikes 
in a "bourgeois" order were a legitimate and appropriate method of struggle, capable of achieving 
real gains. 
Similarly, when strikes fail in social contexts where workers continue to identify elements 
of superordinate authority with a greater national interest, they temporarily lose their appeal as 
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weapons of struggle. In the circumstances Russian workers found themselves by the fall of 1917, 
where workers increasingly felt there was no superordinate authority worth respecting, it is easy 
to understand the logic of increasing violence and direct action, the "retreat," a s  it were, to the use 
of "raw" power on the part of workers and others inside the workplace and out. An extremely 
high concentration of such incidents in Moscow and Petrograd took place, for example, in the 
leather trades, where resistant owners' of unprofitable enterprises continued to frustrate the hopes 
and needs of workers ready to return to their jobs. And elsewhere, a much larger number of cases 
of direct action which earlier had occurred independently of strikes now took place in conjunction 
with strikes themselves, as  strikers and their sympathizers no longer believed that shutting down 
production alone was a sufficient means to achieve their goals. As we have documented 
elsewhere, our data on incidents of this sort are limited to the capitals and are not complete. Still, 
the magnitude of changes spring to fall is startling. As many as  75 percent of the attacks on 
managerial personnel, the seizure of factories, the blockage of goods shipments and other forms of 
direct action by workers that took place in connection with strikes during all of 1917 in Moscow 
and Petrograd appear to have occurred between September 1 and October 25.38 
In these and other incidents of direct action as  well, moreover, we can see again the 
powerful hand of the metalists. Although their involvement in strikes nearly disappeared, the 
available evidence suggests that approximately three in five cases of direct action in factories in 
Moscow and Petrograd occurred in metal plants in September and October, despite the existence 
in both places of signed collective contracts. Even the "peace" secured in this way was no longer 
here a basis for order. 
The months between February and October were a period in which the appropriate nature 
of power and authority, the very concepts of democracy, legality, and justice, and indeed, the very 
nature of class identities themselves were in the process of formation and definition in 
revolutionary Russia. For tens of thousands of industrial and other workers, the crucible in which 
. 
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these concepts and values were forged was not the electoral mechanism of the soviets, local 
dumas, or Constituent Assembly, preceded by public debate over diverse and competing ideologies, 
nor even less formal struggles over what were appropriate political alliances, although these 
remained important and had certainly dominated Russian politics (and political history) f i r  years. 
It was instead the common daily practice of the factory or shop, the ordinary experience of work. 
It was here that the competitive notions of class and nation, of impulsive versus orderly struggle, 
did or did not take hold, depending on how ideas reflected (and were refracted through) daily 
realities and these realities perceived. 
For workers and others to restrain the forms of power that had toppled the tsar, and begin 
to internalize some degree of respect for the superordinate authority of the new "democratic" state 
and its laws, as  both soviet and government leaders hoped they could do, the logic and justice of 
"orderly conflict," of bargaining and strikes, had to be clear. And so it seemed to be in the "weeks 
of conciliation" before July. While strikes in these weeks continued to be led by workers bearing a 
strong resemblance to the "revolutionary vanguard" dominating earlier moments of labor 
activism, they focused overwhelmingly on labor-management issues considered by both sides to be 
appropriate to the new order. Strikes themselves were primarily an instrument of negotiation; 
strikers sought to acheive gains within the newly created system of labor-management conflict 
legitimated by the authority of the state and the soviets, or a t  most, to extend the frontier of 
workers' power within the system, but without overturning it. 
In terms of what we might call the "bourgeois-democratic" paradigm of labor relations, the 
changing pattern of the social composition of the strike force followed a clear mobilizational- 
economic logic in the spring, a s  Diane Koenker and I have elaborated in detail e l~ewhere.~ '  The 
old revolutionary vanguard dominated the strike movement before July because these workers 
were the most capable of mobilizing resources and energy to take advantage of the new open 
climate in labor relations. Their past strike experience alone furnished them with valuable lessons 
in organization. Workers in Petrograd and to a lesser extent in Moscow also had the benefit of 
contacts with trade union organizations before the revolution, and were likely to have developed 
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networks that would facilitate the organization of strikes in 1917. Although well paid, they did not 
strike because of their high wages but because of their declining real wages: their higher wages 
gave them the economic resources to carry out further struggle. 
The very process of striking could not help but broaden a sense of class identity for 
management and labor both in 1917, however, even if in the particular moment it was still 
typographers or Putilovtsv who took to the streets. Conflict in any form necessarily conveyed to 
those involved a clearer sense of who they were &, as well as  who they were, strengthening 
aggregate identities even among very disparate groups. Leather workers in Kazan' learned 
quickly what metalists were doing in Petrograd; laundresses and restaurant workers knew a t  once 
that men and women from the factories sympathized with their struggle and were willing to give 
them support. The question in these circumstances was not whether class alliances and 
consciousness would strengthen, but whether stronger class formations would accept the 
legitimacy and authority of the new order, its rules of struggle. 
This "bourgeois democratic" pattern of labor-management conflict and strike activism was, 
of course, a fragile one a t  best in Russia's political culture. Even in the spring, as we have seen, 
an underlying challenge to managerial authority and traditional management prerogatives 
appeared in the common discourse of strikes, the language of demands. The importance of this ' 
was not a t  first that it greatly threatened social stability or the new state order. To some degree, 
strikes and labor-management conflict everywhere are about the shifting frontiers of power, just 
as  they form a basis for reordering social relations. The problem in revolutionary Russia was that 
challenges to managerial authority were simultaneously a test of the resiliency of the system. 
They also imbued the process of class formation and developing class consciousness with a tension 
over the use of power in the workplace, one which facilitated the efforts of Bolsheviks and others 
to associate class formation with the use of power in its mass or direct forms. 
As Russia's economy progressively weakened in 1917, strikes became an increasingly 
dubious method of extracting concessions. As we have seen, however, the very nature of 
management-labor interactions in these weeks tended to reinforce rather than diminish the 
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impulse to strike. Workers found it more and more difficult to bargain by other means; 
management became increasingly convinced that concessions were unwarranted, unnecessary, and 
more dangerous politically than resistance. Strikes after July consequently became increasingly 
contentious over issues of control and workplace power, rather than simply of economic gains, 
even if the formal (manifest) language of protest remained largely as before. The logical 
relationships we can measure in statistical regressions between strikes and wages, between 
strikes and past experience a t  plant or enterprise mobilization, began to collapse. 
Thus we would argue that the "bourgeois democratic" paradigm of strikes was joined by a 
new, revolutionary paradigm, in which hundreds of thousands of workers downed their tools even 
though a purely economic logic argued their chances for success were small. Increasing numbers of 
industrialists and enterprise owners became themselves class conscious in these weeks as workers 
behaved from their perspective with an ever greater degree of "irrationality." Even to many 
moderates in the soviets, strikes in particular came to reflect "anarchist" impulses. As we have 
suggested, however, the behavior of most strikers was only "irrational" under of the "old" rules of 
labor relations, which assumed all parties to labor-management conflict recognized the 
fundamental viability of the established socio-economic system, and hence the legitimacy of the 
political order that supported it. By the fall, as  aggregate class identities became increasingly 
sharp, the system itself was working fitfully a t  best; and its rules, never firmly established in the 
first place, were changing. Its methods of struggle, consequently, and especially strikes, became 
ready instruments for quite different ends. 
I t  is primarily in these terms finally, that one might best understand the "politicization" of 
labor activism generally in 1917, and certainly of strikes. In all of their forms, strikes were the 
central experience of more workers than any other activist form, and thus the principal conduit of 
mobilization and consciousness. Most important, strikes were the flashpoints of labor-management 
relations and hence of interactions between classes, or perhaps more precisely, of classes-in- 
formation, even if the elements of class consciousness and structure were established well before 
1917. These interactions constituted the core of the process of struggle for power in the 
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revolutionary arena, far moreso, we would argue, than even the massive political demonstrations 
in April, June, July, and August, however important these latter protests also were to the course 
of events. The process of struggle in the workplace conditioned relations in all other areas, in the 
Provisional Government, in municipal dumas, in the streets. I t  structured perceptions and created 
a discourse on power quite removed from the language and of government ministers and moderate 
leaders of the soviets. And in the nature of strike activism itself one can perceive as  well the depth 
of worker grievance, the formative elements of class consciousness, the strengthening elements of 
intractable social polarization, and the logic of revolutionary commitment. 
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Metals 








Percent of Workforce on Strike and Strike Propensities 
March 3 - July 6 and July 7 - October 25* 
(Single-Industry Strikes Only) 
1 2 3 
Percent of All Percent of Branch Strike 
Industrial Strikers Workforce on Strike Propensity 
(Intensity) 
Mar-Jul Jul-Oct Mar-Jul Jul-Oct Mar-Jul Jul-Oct 
NM = Not meaningful. 
* Strike propensities show relative propensities among these industrial branches only. Mining (oil), 
mixed products, and other industrial sectors are excluded. The number of strikers is a minimum 
estimate based on approximations for 76.8 percent of all strikes. 
** Includes all animal by-products workers. 
Table 2 
Strikes and Strike Intensities by Region, Before and After July 6* 















March 3 - July 6 
Strikes Intensity 
3 5 81.9 
142 49.3 
9 13.0 
7 9 10.0 
27 4.9 
4 3.4 







July 7 - October 25 
Strikes Intensity 
2 6 12.7 
58 132.8 
16 74.0 









* Provinces grouped within these regions are listed in Koenker and Rosenberg, Strikes and 
Revolutioq, Appendix 1. Strike intensity measures the percent of workforce on strike. 
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Table 3 
Distribution of Strikers .by Demand Category 
March 3 - July 6 
Overt 















NM = Not meaningful. 
* Includes building and construction workers, teachers, agricultural laborers, and others. 
Table 4 

















March 3 - July 6 
2 
July 7 - October 25 
* Includes building and construction workers, teachers, agricultural laborers, and others. 








To July 1 
July Days 
Table 5 
Strikes and Strikers by Demands, March 3 - July 6 
1 2 3 4 
Minimum 
Estimated Number Percent of 
Strikes Percent* of Strikers Strikers 
(Non-Pol. only) 
363 71.0 300,350 92.9 . 
146 28.6 118,230 36.6 
8 5 16.6 69,840 21.6 
38  7.4 57,012 17.6 
(Pol. only) 
12 2.3 21,077 7.1 
2 0.4 275,300 92.9 
Challenge to Management Authority (All) 
201 39.3 147,590 23.8 
* Percentages exceed 100 percent because most strikes involved more than one demand category. 
Table 6 
Distribution of Demands Challenging Authority 
by Industrial Branch and Sector 
(Strikers as Percent of the Group's Total Number of Striking Workers) 
1 2 
March 3 - July 6 July 7 - October 25 
Industrial Branch 
Metals 












NM = Not meaningful. 
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Table 7 
Strikes and Strikers by Demands, July 7- October 25 
Challenges to 
Management Authority 
1 2 3 4 
Minimum 
Estimated Number Percent of 
Strikes Percent': , of Strikers Strikers 
* Percentages exceed 100 percent because most strikes involved more than one demand category. 
* * Non-political strikes only. 
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